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Combining information from the Firm Survey of Labor Costs with the
information about claims filed with the Guarantee Fund by workers
whose employers defaulted on their severance pay obligations, the pa-
per analyzes the so-called non-performance problem of severance pay
– the fact that coverage, and thus legal entitlement, does not guarantee
the actual receipt of the benefit – as experienced in Slovenia in 2000.
The findings are threefold: (i) one-third of total obligations incurred by
firms failed to be honored and only a small portion of defaulted sever-
ance pay claims was reimbursed by the Guarantee Fund; (ii) while both
men and women seem to be equally aﬀected, workers older than 40
were disproportionally represented among those whose severance pay
claims failed to be honored; and, (iii) among firms that incurred sever-
ance pay liabilities, larger and more productive firms were more likely
to observe their fiduciary obligations and pay them out. These findings
corroborate the weaknesses of severance pay as an income protection
program, pointing to the large scale of the non-performance problem
and the inequities created by it.
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Introduction
Being widely used in both the developed and developing world, sever-
ance pay is the most prevalent program oﬀering income compensation
in the case of job loss.¹ Despite being so widespread, evaluations show
that severance pay not only creates important ineﬃciencies but also often
fails to provide adequate protection. On the eﬃciency front, severance
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pay reduces employment and labor market flows, hinders technologi-
cal progress and innovations, pushes workers into the informal sector,
and creates significant litigation costs (see Addison and Teixeira (2001)
for a review of both theoretical and empirical eﬀects). Its scorecard on
the income protection front is also rather negative. First, generous sev-
erance pay hinders access to formal sector jobs by disadvantaged groups
(oecd 1999). Second, the same amount of severance is paid regardless
of the duration of the unemployment spell following the separation, re-
sulting in over-payments to workers with short and under-payments to
workers with long unemployment spells. And third, severance pay suf-
fers from the so-called non-performance problem – the fact that cover-
age, and thus legal entitlement, does not guarantee the actual receipt of
the benefit.
The non-performance of severance pay is largely an ‘uncharted terri-
tory,’ as only a handful of studies provide hard empirical evidence about
this aspect of severance pay. Because severance is not administered by a
public authority, information about the incidence of severance pay obli-
gations as well as about how frequently firms actually honor such obli-
gations is rarely accessible. While ad-hoc evidence exists (for example,
from litigation cases where workers are suing their employers for the
non-payment of severance pay), we are familiar with only two studies
that report evidence on non-performance-based on micro-data. One is
MacIsaac and Rama (2000), who estimate that in the early 1990s only
about half of Peruvian workers legally entitled to severance pay received
the benefit (MacIsaac and Rama report that the payment was more likely
if workers had a written contract and if they worked in a large, unionized
firm that paid social security contributions). The other is Mansor et al.
(2001), who report that Malaysian workers who were laid oﬀ in 1998 re-
ceived 83 percent of the total amount of severance pay that they claimed
from their employers.
This paper is an attempt to provide further insights into the non-
performance problem of the severance pay. It focuses on the Slovenian
severance pay program and addresses the following questions:
• How severe is the non-performance problem in Slovenia? That is, of
total liabilities arising from the payment of severance, what are (i)
the share of severance pay paid out by firms, (ii) the share paid out
by the Guarantee Fund of Slovenia, and (iii) the share that failed to
be paid out?
• In particular, are any groups strongly aﬀected? That is, what is the
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age and sex composition of workers whose severance pay claims are
not honored?
• What are the characteristics of the firms that honor their obligations
arising from severance pay in comparison to those that fail to do so?
Because of information availability, Slovenia is particularly suitable for
studying the above questions. First, in 2000 the Statistical Oﬃce of Slove-
nia carried out a survey of labor costs incurred by firms, the survey that
among others provides information about the amount of severance paid
out by each firm. Second, Slovenia is one of few transition countries that
has introduced the Guarantee Fund to help the laid-oﬀworkers with par-
tial reimbursement of their outstanding severance pay claims, and the
information collected by this fund is a valuable source for studying sev-
erance pay non-performance.²
These two sources – the Firm Survey of Labor Costs and the Guaran-
tee Fund – are thus complementary, one providing information about
severance pay obligations paid out by firms and the other about obliga-
tions that failed to be paid out by firms. Taken together, the data establish
a composite rendering of fulfilled and unfulfilled severance pay obliga-
tions in Slovenia.
The main findings of the paper are as follows. First, the non-perfor-
mance of severance pay has been a significant problem in Slovenia, with
one-third of total obligations incurred by firms failing to be honored
(in 2000, the year focused upon by the study) and only a small portion
of non-paid severance pay claims being reimbursed by the Guarantee
Fund. Second, while both men and women seem to be equally aﬀected,
workers older than 40 were disproportionally represented among those
whose severance pay claims failed to be honored. And third, among firms
that incurred severance pay liabilities, larger and more productive firms
were more likely to pay them out.
These findings corroborate the weaknesses of severance pay as an
income protection program, pointing to the large scale of the non-
performance problem and inequities created by it.
The paper is organized as follows. The second section describes the
legal framework of severance pay in Slovenia. The third section provides
a comparison of severance pay programs in transition countries. The
fourth describes the data andmethodology, and the fifth section presents
the results of the empirical analysis of the non-performance problem of
the Slovenian severance pay program. The last section concludes with a
summary and policy implications.
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Description of the Legal System of Slovenia’s Severance Pay
In Slovenia, severance pay is regulated by the Labor Code, the Law on
the Public Guarantee Fund, and the Law on Bankruptcy and Liquida-
tion, and is further guided by Collective bargaining agreements, as well
as individual contracts (on the managerial level). Mandated severance
pay is paid to laid-oﬀ workers and workers who retire, with the level of
pay proportional to the work tenure of the worker with his or her former
employer. To address the non-performance problem of severance pay, a
Guarantee Fund was introduced in 1997, with the Fund partly reimburs-
ing the unpaid severance pay claims of workers.
Slovenia introduced a Labor Code in 1990 and a new one in 2003. The
1990 Labor Code mandated severance for early retirees as well as for re-
dundant workers. While for early retirees the law did not prescribe the
amount of severance pay, it did so for redundant workers. For each year
of service, workers with at least two years of service were entitled to half
of their monthly average wage for every year of service, with the wage
determined on the basis of the wage paid in the last three months of em-
ployment. Other cases for severance pay were not legally binding.
The 2003 Labor Code significantly diﬀers from the previous one, by
defining more precisely the obligations on the part of employers and the
rights of workers. Workers are entitled to severance pay if they retire or
they are dismissed (either because of business reasons or bankruptcy or
even in the case of his/her incompetence). Retired workers are entitled to
the severance pay of two average wages, calculated from three-months’
average wage in Slovenia, or (if more favorable to the employee) two av-
erage wages, calculated from his/her three-months’ average wage before
retirement. In contrast, the basis for the calculation of the severance pay
for dismissed workers is the average monthly wage which was received
by the employee, or which would have been received by the worker if
working, in the last three months before the termination is taken. The
employee is entitled to severance pay amounting to:
• 1/5 of the basis for each year of employment with the employer, if
the employee has been employed with the employer for more than
one and up to five years;
• 1/4 of the basis for each year of employment with the employer, if
the employee has been employed with the employer for period from
five to fifteen years;
• 1/3 of the basis for each year of employment with the employer, if
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the employee has been employed with the employer for period ex-
ceeding fifteen years.
It is worthwhile to stress that also under the 2003 law, the severance pay
program remains unrelated to the unemployment insurance program.
That is, qualifying workers receive severance pay and, in addition, they
also qualify for unemployment insurance benefits (which can be received
for up to two years, see van Ours and Vodopivec 2006).
To protect worker’s rights in the case of a firm’s insolvency, in 1997
Slovenia – following the 1980 eu directive 80/987 – introduced the Pub-
lic Guarantee Fund. Workers, legally entitled to severance pay but un-
successful in its exaction, can claim partial reimbursement of their sev-
erance pay claims from the Fund, with the ceiling on such reimburse-
ments being a monthly minimum wage.³ Moreover, under the 1993 Law
on Bankruptcy and Liquidation, workers can sue their former employers
that undergo a liquidation or bankruptcy process, with workers’ sever-
ance pay claims having a priority over other claims (up to a limit – for
details, see Kresal Šoltes 1997).
Review of Severance Pay Program in Transition Countries
In putting Slovenia in an international context, we draw heavily on the
Schwab (2003) analysis of 21 transition countries.⁴ While all these coun-
tries mandate severance pay, the countries diﬀer in important details.
These include the extent of coverage, eligibility conditions, generosity of
benefits and whether benefits should vary with seniority, and what to
do when bankruptcy prevents the employer frommaking severance pay-
ments.
eligibility
Transition countries mandate severance pay for economic dismissals
such as the employer’s liquidation, bankruptcy, or reduction of staﬀ due
to economic, technological, structural, or similar changes.⁵ Many coun-
tries require severance pay only for economic dismissals. These countries
include the Czech Republic, Georgia, Hungary, Macedonia, Poland, Ser-
bia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and Vietnam. In some other countries,
though, workers are also entitled to severance pay for a variety of other
dismissals. These other dismissals are generally for individual reasons,
such as when the worker proves incompetent for the position or is dis-
abled by health reasons.
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Not all dismissed workers, even among those dismissed for economic
reasons, are entitled to severance payments. Countries diﬀer in eligibility
conditions. One-third of the countries included in our analysis require a
minimum length of employment with the firm before a dismissed worker
is entitled to severance pay. The required seniority ranges from one to
three years for economic dismissals, and up to five years for other dis-
missals. Slovenia and Vietnam require one year of employment before a
worker is entitled to severance pay. Bosnia andHerzegovina, Croatia, and
Macedonia require two years of seniority. Hungary requires three years
of seniority. Bulgaria requires five year of seniority before a worker is en-
titled to severance pay for dismissals due to illness (but has no seniority
requirements for economic dismissals).
level of benefits
Of the 21 countries included in our analysis, 13 use a sliding scale con-
nected to years of employment – Bulgaria, China, Croatia, Estonia, Hun-
gary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, North Korea, Poland, Serbia and
Montenegro, Slovenia, and Vietnam; severance pay in the rest of the
countries included in the study does not vary with seniority. By design,
in sliding-scale countries more senior workers are entitled to more gen-
erous severance pay. In general, the level of benefits in sliding-scale coun-
tries exceeds those in fixed-benefit countries.
dealing with the non-performance problem
A major issue connected with severance pay is the inability of insol-
vent employers to make severance payments. Fifteen countries have rat-
ified ilo Convention 173, including four transition countries: Latvia,
Lithuania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. According to this convention, coun-
tries can choose between giving priority to severance pay claims in the
employer’s bankruptcy proceedings or creating a Guarantee Fund to pro-
tect severance-pay claims (together with unpaid wages) – with Slovenia,
as mentioned above, opting for both.
Data andMethodology
Below we describe the micro-level data sources and methodology used
in the empirical analysis of Slovenia’s severance pay.
data sources
The following data sources are used:
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• Firm-level data were obtained from the 2000 Labor Costs Survey
in Slovenia, administered by the Statistical Oﬃce of Slovenia. The
sample comprised 3,021 enterprises, selected among those with 10 or
more workers. Information included severance pay that firms paid
both to laid-oﬀ and retired workers.
• Individual-level data were gathered from worker requests to the
Guarantee Fund of Slovenia in the period from 1994 to 2003. For
each individual, data included unpaid severance pay obligations,
requested amount from the Fund, amount paid by the Fund, the
gender and age of the applicant, and previous employer.
• Firm-level measure of eﬃciency produced by production function
estimation. We used the value of the error term – εijt – for 2000,
obtained by the following ols estimation of translog production
function for the Slovenian manufacturing firms for the 1994–2001
period:
lnqijt = α0 +
n∑
k=1
αklnxijkt +
1
2
n∑
k=1
n∑
1=1
βkllnxijkt lnxijlt + εijt , (1)
where the inputs xijkt include measures of labor, capital, and ma-
terial inputs; αk and βkl are, respectively, first- and second-order
translog production parameters (i refers to individual firms, j to
two-digit industry categories, and t to time) – see Orazem and
Vodopivec (2008) for details of estimation and data sources used.⁶
Methodology for the analysis of firm-level determinants of severance
pay payout. To investigate whether firm eﬃciency and size aﬀect the like-
lihood of paying severance pay given that firms incurred such costs, that
is, that they laid-oﬀ workers, we ran a multinomial logit model with the
following options for the dependent variable:
• firm did not incur severance obligations (taken as a baseline),
• firm incurred severance obligations and paid them, and
• firm incurred severance obligations and did not pay them.
As explanatory variables, we used eﬃciency of the firm and firm
size. To capture firm size eﬀects, we used a dummy variable indicating
whether a firm had more than 100 workers.
Empirical Results
This section presents the results of our empirical analysis of the sever-
ance pay non-performance in Slovenia. As explained above, we focus on
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0–9 2%
10–29 5%
30–99 39%
100–249 24%
250+ 30%
figure 1 Paid severance pay – structure by size, 2000 (computations based on the
2000 Labor Cost Survey)
Agriculture 0.82%
Mining 1.87%
Manufacturing 63.29%
Electricity 1.38%
Construction 2.35%
Trade 13.67%
Hotels 2.80%
Transport 1.81%
Finance 1.77%
Real estate 8.43%
Public admin. 0.21%
Education 0.56%
Health 0.81%
Other services 0.22%
figure 2 Paid severance pay – structure by industry, 2000 (computations based on
the 2000 Labor Cost Survey)
the following aspects: the severity of the non-performance problem, the
composition of workers whose severance pay claims fail to be paid out,
and the characteristics of firms that fail to pay their severance pay obli-
gations.
To put these questions in the context, however, let us first present
statistics about severance pay liabilities that were paid out. We focus on
year 2000, the year for which we have Labor Cost Survey data. First, the
overall amount of severance pay liabilities paid out in 2000 was BC 17.5
million – 0.085 percent of gdp or 0.2 percent of the total wage bill. While
this is a rather modest amount, it certainly is not a negligible one. Sec-
ond, most of severance pay obligations was paid by large firms; for ex-
ample, 93 percent of severance pay was paid out by firms with more than
30 workers (see figure 1). Third, the majority (more than 60 percent) of
paid severance pay obligations was incurred in manufacturing (figure 2),
suggesting that in 2000 this sector was still undergoing an intense re-
structuring.
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table 1 Severance pay payments, reimbursements, and unpaid claims, 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Payments made by firms 17.5 64.3 0.085 0.162
Reimbursements made by the Guarantee Fund 0.7 2.7 0.004 0.007
Unpaid severance pay claims 9.0 33.0 0.044 0.083
Total 27.3 100.0 0.132 0.252
notes (1) amount (BC million), (2) structure (%), (3) share in gdp (%), (4) share in
worker compensation (%). Computations based on 2000 Labor Costs Survey and the
Guarantee Fund of Slovenia.
severity of severance pay non-performance
Our results show that in 2000, the non-performance of severance pay
posed a serious problem in Slovenia. Out of the total of BC 27.3 million
severance pay obligations, BC 9.0 million – 33 percent – failed to be hon-
ored (by firms that incurred these obligations or by the Guarantee Fund
– see table 1). The role of the Guarantee Fund in helping with unpaid
obligations proved to be very limited, as the Fund only reimbursed BC 0.7
million or 7.2 percent of total unpaid severance pay obligations.⁷ Indeed,
according to its rules (see above), the Guarantee Fund reimbursed un-
paid severance pay claims only partially, and so less than 10 percent of
the average claim was actually reimbursed (see figure 3).
In the 1990s, the magnitude of the non-performance of severance pay
was most likely even larger. Figure 4 shows the number of cases of sever-
ance pay reimbursements by the Guarantee Fund in the period from 1994
until 2003. This figure reflects the pattern of transition and suggests that
the problem of severance pay non-performance was probably even more
serious in the mid-1990s, when the number of workers turning to the
Guarantee Fund for reimbursements was more than double the number
in 2000. Moreover, in the period from 1994 to 2003 around 43,000 work-
ers failed to receive payment from their former employers despite their
legal entitlement.
which workers are affected by non-performance
of severance pay?
To find out whether some groups of workers were disproportionally af-
fected by severance pay non-performance, we analyzed the composition
of workers reporting unpaid severance claims. We found no evidence of
diﬀerences between men and women, but workers above 40 years were
more aﬀected by severance pay non-performance than younger workers.
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1994
1940.31
290.50
1995
2322.60
285.16
1996
2972.76
255.29
1997
2251.11
240.14
1998
3664.83
240.05
1999
3475.45
257.25
2000
3583.69
274.83
2001
3858.38
285.50
2002
2872.17
302.62
2003
2879.94
301.94
figure 3 Average severance pay claims and reimbursements, 1994–2003 (BC, light gray
– average reimbursments, dark gray – average claims; computations based
on information provided by the Guarantee Fund of Slovenia)
1994 6555
1995 7738
1996 9019
1997 5725
1998 7912
1999 4688
2000 3125
2001 2505
2002 2989
2003 1177
figure 4 Number of cases of reimbursements, 1994–2003 (based on information
provided by the Guarantee Fund of Slovenia)
Figure 5 shows that severance pay non-performance has not aﬀected
men and women diﬀerently, as the reimbursements to men and women
were rather similar in size. Over the 1994–2003 period, the Guarantee
Fund paid 50.8 percent of total severance pay reimbursements to women
and 49.2 percent to men), which correspond well to the employment
shares of these groups (in 2000, men represented 51 percent of total em-
ployment and women 49 percent).
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1994
2498
3088
1995
3114
3379
1996
3179
4550
1997
2122
2704
1998
4627
2547
1999
1563
2119
2000
1216
1504
2001
1440
631
2002
1812
847
2003
200
292
figure 5 Structure of severance pay reimbursements by gender, 2000 (BC, light gray –
men, dark gray – women; based on information provided by the Guarantee
Fund of Slovenia)
Turning to the age distribution of claimants, figure 6 compares the age
distribution of severance pay claimants with the age distribution of the
active population in Slovenia in the same period (1994–2003). Clearly,
among the claimants, workers over 40 years of age are over-represented
– while their share in the population is 47 percent and 42 percent for men
and women, respectively, their share among the claimants is 64 percent
and 51 percent for men and women, respectively.
firm characteristics and non-performance
The last part of our analysis sheds light on characteristics of firms that
are paying out severance pay in comparison to those that are failing to
honor their legal entitlements. The estimation of the multinominal logit
model (see table 2) shows that the larger and more productive the firm,
the more likely it is to honor its severance pay obligations.
Concluding Remarks
Being one of the rare examples of its kind, the paper seeks to provide
insights into the non-performance problem of severance pay by analyz-
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Active population
Under 20
2.1%
2.5%
20 to 24
9.9%
9.9%
25 to 29
14.2%
12.8%
30 to 34
15.7%
13.8%
35 to 39
16.2%
14.2%
40 to 44
15.9%
14.3%
45 to 49
14.2%
13.7%
50 to 54
6.2%
9.6%
55 to 59
2.1%
4.8%
60 to 64
1.3%
2.1%
Above 64
2.1%
2.4%
Claimants
Under 20
0.1%
0.2%
20 to 24
3.0%
2.5%
25 to 29
11.0%
6.9%
30 to 34
16.8%
11.7%
35 to 39
18.2%
15.1%
40 to 44
21.7%
19.3%
45 to 49
20.7%
20.2%
50 to 54
7.6%
15.5%
55 to 59
0.9%
7.8%
60 to 64
0.0%
0.7%
Above 64
0.0%
0.0%
figure 6 Age distribution of claimants and active population in Slovenia, 1994–2003
(light gray – man, dark gray – women; based on the information provided
by the Guarantee Fund of Slovenia)
ing the working of this program in Slovenia. Our findings suggest that
severance pay non-performance has been a significant problem in Slove-
nia. In 2000, only two-thirds of total severance pay obligations were ac-
tually honored, a small portion of non-paid severance pay claims was
reimbursed by the Guarantee Fund, and the rest – one-third of total
obligations – was not paid at all. Moreover, we showed that while both
men and women were equally aﬀected, workers older than 40 years were
more likely than younger ones to be confronted by severance pay non-
performance. And, finally, we also found that among firms that incurred
severance pay liabilities, larger and more productive firms were more
likely to pay them out.
Taken together, these findings shed a rather negative light on severance
pay as an income protection program for the unemployed. First, the pro-
gram fails to protect a significant share of those who are legally entitled
to such protection – even after the introduction of the Guarantee Fund.
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table 2 Multinomial logit estimates of the likelihood of severance pay
non-performance
Multinomial logit estimates Descriptive statistics1
Paying severance
obligations
Failing to pay severance
obligations
(1) (2) (1) (2) (3) (4)
(a) –0.04 0.49 –5.76** 2.17 0.07 0.21
(b) 1.38** 0.28 0.47 0.88 0.61 0.49
(c) –286** 0.25 –5.35** 0.81
notes The definition of dependent variable: not incurring severance obligations is
taken as a baseline, and incurring severance obligations and paying them, and incurring
severance obligations and failing to pay them, as other options. No. of observations:
816, pseudoR2: 0,056. 1 Mean value of dependent variable is 0/08, and its standard error
is 0.27. (a) Eﬃciency of the firm, (b) size of the firm (1 if firm’s employment exceeds 100
workers, 0 otherwise), (c) constant; (1) coeﬃcient, (2) robust standard error, (3) mean,
(4) standard deviation. Significance at 1 and 5 percent levels are indicated by ** and
*, respectively.
Second, the program is prone to creating inequities, as it disproportion-
ally aﬀected older workers. At the same time, our findings also provide
some clues about how to make the program more eﬀective. The fact that
less productive – and hence less profitable – firms are less likely to honor
their obligations suggests that non-performance is strongly related to the
non-funded nature and limited risk-pooling of severance pay, and thus
the recommendation of converting severance pay to a funded program.
Let us conclude with recommendations for better coordinating sever-
ance pay with other income support systems for the unemployed. First,
countries with both unemployment insurance and severance pay pro-
grams (Slovenia being one of them) can save on costs without reduc-
ing insurance by better coordinating payments under the two programs.
Namely, unemployment insurance eligibility rules could be adjusted so
that insurance benefits would only start after the severance benefits ‘ex-
pire,’ that is, after n months, if the individual received n monthly wages
as the severance payment (such a program is in place in some developed
countries, for example, in Canada – see Vodopivec 2004).
Another possibility – explicitly addressing the non-performance prob-
lem – is the conversion of severance pay to pre-funded unemployment
insurance savings accounts (uisas), a reform implemented by Austria
in 2002.⁸ Besides correcting for the non-performance problem, uisas
would improve eﬃciency by removing obstacles to labor market flexi-
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bility and reducing litigation costs. Lastly, the most radical option is the
introduction of an integrated severance and ui system (Chilean model),
consisting of two components: uisas and a solidarity fund, with benefit
recipients first drawing benefits from their uisas and upon depletion,
reverting to the solidarity fund (for details of the reform, see Acevedo,
eskenazi, and Pagés 2006, and for theoretical considerations, Parsons,
forthcoming).
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Notes
1 See Holzmann, Iyer, and Vodopivec (2008) for a survey of the incidence of
the severance pay around the world and a review of the origin, economic
rationale, and current attempts to reform severance pay programs.
2 Guarantee Fund also exists in Estonia, Romania and Uzbekistan.
3 Under the 1993 Law on Bankruptcy and Liquidation, workers can sue their
former employers that undergo a liquidation or bankruptcy process, with
workers’ severance pay claims having a priority over other claims (up to a
limit – for details, see Kresal Šoltes 1997).
4 Three socialist countries (China, North Korea, and Vietnam); eight suc-
cessor countries of ussr (Azerbaijan, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan,
Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, and Ukraine); five successor countries of Yu-
goslavia (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia and Mon-
tenegro, and Slovenia); two successor countries of Czechoslovakia (Czech
Republic and Slovak Republic), and three former socialist European coun-
tries (Bulgaria, Hungary, and Poland).
5 Most oecd countries also have mandatory severance pay programs, but
some – including Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and the United States – leave such
arrangements to collective bargaining or rely on the common law provi-
sions. For example, in the Netherlands, even though the law does not re-
quire severance pay, employers oftenmake payments to dismissed workers
to avoid legal proceedings for an ‘obviously unreasonable dismissal.’ The
cantonal courts have even created a statutory-like formula for the amount
of severance payments.
6 Alternative measures of eﬃciency, obtained via fixed eﬀects and random
eﬀects estimation of the above translog production function, yielded sim-
ilar results.
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7 It is possible that some workers received additional reimbursement from
bankruptcy or liquidation proceeds – we do not have any information
about such reimbursements.
8 In 2002, Austria converted its severance pay to a fully funded contribu-
tory system akin to unemployment insurance savings accounts (Koman,
Schuh, and Weber 2005). The reform extended the entitlement to work-
ers with short tenures and removed obstacles to worker mobility, granting
full portability and allowing the accumulation of benefits from the begin-
ning of an employment spell. Employers pay 1.5 percent of each worker’s
salary to each individual worker, with resources held in a central account
and invested in the capital market. Laid-oﬀ workers with job tenure of
three years or more can withdraw accumulations in their accounts or keep
them and claim them upon retirement. Workers who separate voluntarily
or have tenures of less than three years are denied the right of immediate
withdrawal, a feature that may hinder worker mobility.
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